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THE ETHICS OF CLIENT SELECTION: A
MORAL JUSTIFICATION FOR REPRESENTING
UNPOPULAR CLIENTS
TCHIA (TIA) SHACHAR*

INTRODUCTION

Lawyers fulfill a unique and indispensable role in a democratic society. Albeit the obvious consensus in this matter, lawyers who take on the task of representing unpopular or
unorthodox clients and causes are frequently the subject of
heated debates and controversies.' At one end of the spectrum,
are those who vigorously assert that representing the 'man-introuble' at his worst time is the highlight of the legal profession,
and its source of pride. On the other end, are those who preach
for moral accountability and vigorously maintain that there is
nothing noble in dedicating one's knowledge, skills and scarce
resources for the sake of helping reprehensible people or advancing harmful or immoral goals. 2
* LL.B., LL.M., Ph.D., Faculty of law, University of Haifa, Israel. The author
is a lecturer in the fields of legal ethics and criminal law, and an Advocate,
member of the Israel Bar Association. Comments and responses may be directed to: tshachar@law.haifa.ac.il. I am grateful to my dear family for their
love and support.
1 The concept of 'unpopular' or 'unorthodox' client cannot be exhaustively
defined, since it is an amorphous amalgam of individual as well as collective
cultural values. For the purposes of this essay, this concept will be roughly
defined as to include all cases which attract negative public reaction (in contrast to public sympathy or indifference) either due to the client's deeds or
ideology. See Charles W. Wolfram, A Lawyer's Duty to Represent Clients,
Repugnant and Otherwise, in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND

LAWYERS' ETHIcs 214, 225-226 (David J. Luban ed., 1983).

2 For a comprehensive introduction of the moral debate regarding client selection see, e.g., Monroe H. Freedman, Must You Be the Devil's Advocate?
I

Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016

1

DePaul Journal for Social Justice, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 2

DePaul Journal for Social Justice

2

Such debates and controversies usually produce a destructive
"chilling effect" on the availability of counsel.3 Unpopular or
unorthodox clients, which are often already situated at the oppressed and neglected margins of society, are thus prone to experience much greater difficulties in implementing the
constitutional right to representation and finding a lawyer who
will agree to represent them.
Notwithstanding the core principle of democracy, which provides that every person has an equal opportunity to competent
representation, most lawyers, at some point in their careers, find
themselves being forced to publicly justify their decision to represent certain clients. Common examples include the criminaldefense lawyer, who so (too) often confronts the question how
can he sleeps at night after representing notorious criminals murderers, rapists, child molesters and the like; the civil-case attorney, who often confronts the question how can he look himself in the mirror after zealously representing evil-doers who use
the law in order to advance goals which harm society; or the
civil-rights attorney, who frequently confronts the question how
can he silence his conscience after enlisting to his aid the Constitution or other fundamental norms so as to promote morally
wrong causes and ideologies while society is overwhelmed with
"real" and pressing injustices.
LEGAL TIMES (August 23, 1993) in NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY - PROBLEMS OF PRACTICE AND THE PROFESSION 630 (1996);
Michael E. Tigar, Defending 74 TEX. L. REV. 101 (1995); Abe Fortas, Thurman Arnold and the Theatre of the Law, 79 YALE L.J. 988 (1970); Murray L.
Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL. L.
REV. 669, 693-695 (1978); W. Bradley Wendel, Institutional and Individual
Justification in Legal Ethics: The Problem of Client Selection, 34 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 987 (2006).

The cold war period provides us a striking example to that effect. Lawyers
who agreed to represent suspected communists were vigorously persecuted
by both the general public and the American Bar Association. The subsequent reluctance of most lawyers to represent such clients was, thus, an inevitable result. See: JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND
SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 231-262 (1977).
3
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THE ETHICS Or CLIENT SELECTION

From a philosophical point of view, criticism or praise of those
lawyers who undertake the task of representing unpopular clients or causes stems from the unique nature of the lawyer-client
relationship.4 At the core of a lawyer's role lies the action of
representation.5 In essence, this means that a lawyer's consent to
represent a certain individual supposedly obligates the lawyer to
enter the client's shoes, adopt the client's problem as if it was his
own; and from that inside and intimate stance, do his best in order to provide an optimal solution for the client, within the
boundaries of law and ethics.
Hence, the conception of the lawyer's role differs from the
conception of the roles society assigns to all other professionals.
For example, a physician neither enters his patient's shoes at any
stage of the treatment, nor takes upon himself the patient's illness as if it was his own; and it is from that outside and remote
stance that he aspires to implement his medical skills to aid the
patient. A lawyer, unlike a physician or other professionals, has
a distinct and unique role in a way that only he "becomes one"
with the client, as a direct result of the action of representation.
Hence, it is the lawyer - and not the physician or any other professional - who is prone to attract public attention due to decisions regarding the choice of clients.
The unique nature of the lawyer-client relationship raises the
question whether the action of representation, which distinguishes the lawyer's role from the roles of all other professionals, necessarily creates an unbreakable correlation between the
personal morality of the lawyer, and the moral identity of the
individuals or causes he chooses to represent. Presented in another way, the question is whether a good lawyer, who zealously
4

Id. See also David Luban, Reason and Passion in Legal Ethics, 51

REV.

STAN.

L.

873 (1999).

5 Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 63, 76-77 (1980); William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and ProfessionalEthics, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 29, 37; Charles P.
Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 STAN. L. REV. 3, 6 (1951).
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adheres to the ethical standards of professional responsibility regarding representation of unpopular clients or causes, can also
be a good person, worthy of respect and approbation. Essentially, at the center of our inquiry stands the age-old universal
controversy, regarding the nature of the moral clash between
the norms of professional morality ('role morality') on the one
hand, and the norms of personal and common morality, on the
other hand.
This article will present the three prominent moral theories,
which aspire to provide a solution to the controversy. Though
profound and ingenious theories, I shall argue that they are
nonetheless incapable of providing an adequate solution, because they all' possess two identical logical impediments. The
first impediment results from the theories' aspiration to produce
an ultimate analytical explanation, regarding the moral essence
of the lawyer as a role agent 6 within the legal system;7 however,
producing such a unified explanation in pluralist-democratic societies is neither possible nor desired, in light of the highly complex nature of the action of representation. Secondly, in a futile
effort to decode the ultimate moral essence of lawyering, all theories destroy - either deliberately or inadvertently - the essen-

tial analytical dichotomy between the lawyer's professional and
private spheres of life;8 thus, they all eventually rely on such anThe phrase "role agent" refers to the function assigned to the lawyer within
the legal system, by virtue of his professional occupation. See e.g., DAVID
LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 138 (1988). The moral
essence of the lawyer as a role agent stands at the heart of this essay, and will
be discussed in length hereinafter.
7 Though it would be noted that each theory is not designed to stand in and
of itself, but rather has to be fitted into a larger moral theory of professional
conduct. A larger theory would determine the precise relations between the
lawyer's professional, private and communal spheres of life. But the focus of
the present inquiry is only of theories regarding the essence of the action of
representation and the manner they ought to reflect on the larger theory.
8 It shall be noted that the notion of a dichotomy between the lawyer's professional and private spheres of life may be opposed on grounds of the freedom to choose between prospective clients. Those who oppose the said
dichotomy may argue that the freedom given to the lawyer, to pick and
6

Vol ume 6, Number1

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jsj/vol6/iss1/2

Fa
a I 12012

4

Shachar: The Ethics of Client Selection: A Moral Justification for Represe

5

THE ETHICS Or CLIENT SELECTION

alytical frameworks which de-facto prevent a real possibility to
create a clear-cut dichotomy between the lawyer as a professional and the lawyer as a private person.
As I shall argue, due to these interconnected impediments,
none of the available moral theories has ever been able to capture the public's heart or gain extensive support within the legal
community. This has resulted in a dangerously growing trend to
avoid an informed and tolerant debate regarding the moral essence of lawyering, and instead place judgment on lawyers (either favorably or unfavorably) on the basis of haphazard
impulses and demagogic assertions.
Against this background, the purpose of this essay is not to
offer yet another distinctive theory regarding the moral essence
of the lawyer's role, but rather to develop a consensual macro
theory; one that acknowledges diversity but nevertheless provides a preliminary neutral, pragmatic and coherent analytical
infrastructure upon which each individual can build his own ideological sub-theory in a thoughtful, calculated, and tolerant
manner. Since the common denominator of all available theories is the presupposition of the lawyer as an agent whose function is to enhance the client's autonomy, Part III of this essay
choose his clients, inevitably reflects on his private morals and assigns moral
responsibility to the societal outcomes of the representation. See, e.g., Freedman, Must You Be the Devil's Advocate?, supranote 2, at 632; Note, The New
Public Interest Lawyer, 79 YALE L.J. 1069, 1120, 1144 (1970).
As I shall argue in the following chapters, this essay upholds the notion of
a dichotomy between the lawyer's professional and private spheres of life. It
contends that the choice of clients ought to be perceived as a morally-neutral
professional decision which cannot reflect on the lawyer's private morals.
The lawyer, as a professional, does not (and cannot) represent the client's
deeds or beliefs; he only represents the client's rights and liberties under the
law. Hence, the choice of clients may symbolize nothing more than the lawyer's commitment to ensure access to legal services to all the people in need,
regardless of the nature of their personality or individual characteristics and
causes. See, e.g., Fortas, supra note 2, at 1002; Michael E. Tigar, Setting the
Record Straight on the Defense of John Demjanjuk, LEGAL TIMES, (September 6, 1993) in Nathan M. Crystal, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY PROBLEMS OF PRACTICE AND THE PROFESSION 634, 636-637 (1996).
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asserts that the focal point of such a consenstial macro theory
should be the conception of the lawyer as a mere representative
of the client's rights and liberties under the law, rather than of
the client as a person - that is, the conception that although the
action of representation essentially compels the lawyer to "become one" with the client, it is in fact not unification with the
client as a person, but rather with the client's rights and liberties
under the law. Only such publically accepted macro theory,
which does not aspire to impose a singular explanation for performing the action of representation, and has an analytical
framework that explicitly supports a dichotomy between professional morality and personal and common morality, can provide
adequate solution to many of the ethical dilemmas that occupy
the profession nowadays; prominent of which is the problem of
uninformed criticism and vilification of lawyers who carry out
the complex task of representing unpopular clients or causes.

II.

PROMINENT THEORIES OF LEGAL ETHICS REGARDING
THE ESSENCE OF THE ACTION OF REPRESENTATION

A.

Advocacy in an Adversary System

The philosophical premise of the adversarial theory of representation is both client-centered and process-oriented. 9 The lawyer is perceived as an agent whose function is to keenly
maximize the client's autonomy under the law and consequently, guarantee the revelation of legal truth. To the extent
the roles of both parties to the conflict - through their lawyers 9

Seee.g., Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, ProfessionalResponsibility: Re-

port of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159 (1958); Richard Wasserstrom,
Lawyers as Professionals:Some Moral Issues, 5 Hum. RTS. 1, 9-10 (1975);
Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice,37 STAN. L. REV.
589, 595-596 (1985); Monroe H. Freedman, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS'
ETHICS 13-42 (1990); Leslie Griffin, A Client's Theory of Professionalism, 52
EMORY L. REV. 1087, 1087-1088 (2003).
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are not fully played, the court's ability to reveal the truth respectively decreases.10
In order to fully play out this role, a lawyer must exhibit a
categorical readiness to act on an absolute moral belief that his
role mandates keen partisanship and an unconditional commitment to an aggressive and zealous pursuit of the client's objectives, within the boundaries of law and ethics." It is based on
this analytical presupposition that the lawyer is exempt from
moral responsibility for the societal consequences of his professional activities.12

The adversarial theory of representation promotes the notion
of equal and skilled representation across the board and assigns
special importance to the representation of those who are unpopular and indigent. It urges lawyers to not lightly seek to decline representation of unpopular clients; and once the lawyerclient relationship has been contracted, to vigorously (but in a
legal and ethical manner) pursue the client's objectives with no
regard to personal or communal moral values. Despite the adversarial theory's decisive ideological narrative, it ultimately
fails to create a moral dichotomy between the lawyer as a professional and the lawyer as a private person. Its practical failure
is evident in everyday life, as illustrated when lawyers representing unpopular clients or causes are often subjected to harsh criticism, even by the most ardent adherents to the adversarial
model, who perceive the moral distinction between actor and
principal as artificial and unreal. This perception greatly hin10 Id.
11 Id.
12

Id.

See, for example, Professor Monroe Freedman's position regarding the
moral accountability entailed in the clients selection process: Freedman, Must
13

You Be the Devil's Advocate?, supra note 2; Monroe H. Freedman, The Morality of Lawyering, LEGAL TIMES (September 20, 1993) in NATHAN M.

637 (1996). Professor Freedman, as noted, is a strong proponent of the adversarial model.
CRYSTAL, - PROBLEMS OF PRACTICE AND THE PROFESSION

See supra note 9.
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ders the de-facto implementation of the notion of equal representation for all. In certain countries which generally adhere to
the adversarial theory of representation, such as the State of
Israel, the rules of legal ethics simply award lawyers with full
normative discretion to choose between prospective clients with
no instructional guidance whatsoever as to its proper implementation.14 In contrast, other countries possess more comprehensive codes of conduct, which do take great pains (at least in the
narrative aspect) in order to emphasize the special importance
of representing unpopular clients and causes as a means of ensuring equal access to legal services. In the United States, for
example, the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct as well
as the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility state
that while the lawyer is ordinarily at liberty to choose between
prospective clients, he is nonetheless expected to exercise
thoughtful discretion and not lightly decline proffered employment from unpopular people who are prone to experience significant difficulties in attaining competent representation.15
Similarly, in England the Solicitors Code of Conduct (2007)
granted solicitors the liberty to choose clients but nonetheless
stated that it is impermissible to decline proffered employment
on the grounds that the nature of the case or the conduct and
beliefs of the prospective clients are unacceptable to the solicitor or to any section of the public. However, the 2011 revised
Code of Conduct has adopted an "outcomes-focused" approach
which stripped out a lot of the detail of the previous Code. The
new Code now grants solicitors the liberty to choose their clients
with no significant instructional guidance. 1 6 The Barristers'
14

See

REGULATIONS

OF THE ISRAEL BAR

ASSOCIATION

(PROFESSIONAL

ETHIcs) art. 12 (1986).
15 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 1.2 (2012), cmt. 5; and R. 6.2
cnt.1; MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-26 - EC 2-29

(1980).
Solicitors Regulation Authority Code of Conduct, Rules 2.01(1) and
11.04(1) (2007); Solicitors Regulation Authority Code of Conduct, ch. 1, So16

LICITORS

REGULATION

AUTHORITY

HANDBOOK

www.sra.org.uk/solicitors/handbook/pdfcentre.page.
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Code of Conduct is significantly more extreme in that regard,
since it actually imposes obligation on Barristers to represent all
comers.17
At the end of the day, the inconsistent implementation of the
adversarial theory of representation leads us to the inevitable
conclusion that it ultimately fails to create a viable and realistic
moral dichotomy between the lawyer as a professional and the
lawyer as a private person. This failure stems from an analytical
inconsistency, which involves two of the underlying arguments
of the theory: the argument in favor of moral nonaccountabilityls is supposed to somehow co-exist with the argument that lawyers ought to be free to pick and choose their
clients as they please, given the intimacy accorded to the action
of legal representation. The latter argument, however, stands in
direct logical contradiction to the former, and hence undermines
the formation of a compelling dichotomy between the lawyer's
professional and private spheres of life.
tion of the different approach of the 2011 Code, in contrast to the 2007 Code,
see the SRA explanatory note "Outcomes-focused Regulation At a Glance",
available at: www.sra.org.uk/solicitors/freedom-in-practice/OFR/ofr-quickguide.page#ofr-4-2.
17

See CODE OF

CONDUCT OF THE BAR OF ENGLAND AND WALES,

rules 601-

602 (2004), available at: www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/standardsandguidance/codeofconduct; see also infra notes 21-23.
18 The principle of "moral nonaccountability" relieves the lawyer from responsibility to the negative outcomes that may ensue from his decision to
represent an unpopular client or cause. According to this principle, the public
has no valid ground to criticize the lawyer or demand that he attempts to
justify his choice of clients or causes. This principle has been eloquently described by Professor Murray Schwartz: see Schwartz, supra note 2, at 673-674
("The advocate might well reply to the 'how-can-you-defend-him' question: I
represent him because the system demands that I do so... You may not hold
me substantively, professionally, or morally accountable for that behavior...
the concept of moral nonaccountability is equivalent to the filing of a demurrer, rather than an answer, to the charge of immorality. In effect, as long as

the charge does not allege a violation of the established constraints upon
professional behavior, the lawyer is beyond reproof for acting on behalf of
the client.").
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Discretion to choose between prospective clients - i.e., to
choose with whom to enter into an intimate relationship - inherently expresses personal moral choice, which indicates the values of the choosing lawyer, and thus cannot co-exist with the
presumption of moral nonaccountability. 19 A professional who
truly perceives himself as an agent, whose function is to maximize client's autonomy within the adversary system, ought to
possess an intrinsic moral obligation to accept every prospective
client who is in need for his services, unless objective limitations
(time, resources, conflict of interest, etc.) prevent him from doing so.20 He may not decline one potential client and accept another merely due to personal preferences, since this creates a
de-facto hierarchy between people whose rights are more or less
important to the lawyer; and thus imposes moral accountability.
Indeed, for this reason some common law countries do impose on lawyers a disciplinary duty of representation, known as
the "Cab-Rank Rule". In England, for example, Barristers are
obligated to represent every prospective client in any legal field
in which they profess to practice.21 The duty of representation,

however, has a number of broad exceptions which either mandate or allow the Barrister to deny proffered employment for
various reasons, such as insufficient time, improper fee, etc. 2 2 In
practice, the "Cab-Rank Rule" has been proven ineffective due
to its broad exceptions, which can be used in an excessive and
19 Freedman, supra note 2, at 632; Freedman, supra note 13, at 638; David
Pannick, ADVOCATES 136-140 (1992); David Mellinkoff, THE CONSCIENCE
OF A LAWYER 270-271 (1973).
20 When objective limitations exist, the process of client selection ought to
be conducted either chronologically ('first come, first served' basis) or strategically (accepting only clients whose cases bring about fundamental issues
with a wide potential effect). See Pannick, supra note 19; Madeleine C. Petrara, Dangerous Identification: Confusing Lawyers with Their Clients, 19 J.
LEGAL PROF. 179, 185-190 (1995).
21 See CODE OF CONDUCT OF THE BAR OF ENGLAND AND WALES, supra
note 17, Rules 601-602.

See CODE
603-607.
22

OF CONDUCT OF THE BAR OF ENGLAND AND WALES,
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manipulative manner by Barristers who uphold the lawyer's
freedom to choose which clients to represent. This, of course,
creates in England a de-facto dilemma of moral accountability,
which is similar in its essence to the dilemma which de-jure exists in the United States and Israel. 23
Both the Model Rules and Model Code also provide a striking example to the above-mentioned analytical failure, when on
the one hand they explicitly adopt the conception of moral
nonaccountability 24 and encourage lawyers to demonstrate professional responsibility by representing unpopular clients or
causes;25 but also concurrently acknowledge the fact that lawyers may find the client or the cause so repugnant as to be likely
to impair their ability to competently represent the client.26 This
normative connection between the professional and private
spheres proves once again that even adherence to the adversarial theory of representation cannot realistically result in complete isolation of the intimate action of representation from the
private moral spheres of the lawyer.

23

See Charles W. Wolfram, MODERN LEGAL ETHIcs 572 (1986); John A.

Flood,

BARRISTERS' CLERKS - THE LAW'S MIDDLEMEN 80 (1983).
24 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, supra note 15, R. 1.2(b); ABA
MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 15, EC 7-17.
25 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, supra note 15, R. 6.2; ABA MODEL
CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 15, EC 2-26 - EC 2-29.
26 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, supra note 15, R. 6.2 cmt. 2 ("For

good cause a lawyer may seek to decline an appointment to represent a person who cannot afford to retain counsel or whose cause is unpopular. Good
cause exists if... representation would result in an improper conflict of interest, for example, when the client or the cause is so repugnant to the lawyer as
to be likely to impair the client-lawyer relationship."); ABA MODEL CODE
OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 15, EC 2-30 ("[a] lawyer should decline employment if the intensity of his personal feeling, as distinguished
from a community attitude, may impair his effective representation of a prospective client.").

Volume 6, Number I
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B. A Lawyer's "Mind-Set, Heart-Set, Soul-Set"
As one can understand from its name, the philosophical
stance of this theory - which was offered by Professor Barbara
Allen Babcock - is one of personality. At its core stands the
notion that representation of unpopular clients or causes is a
task not meant for everybody. Only a special class of lawyers,
with a peculiar "mind-set, heart-set, soul-set," is capable of
reaching such a high degree of devotion and selflessness, that
enables reconciliation of role with self.2 7
While a lawyer's choice to represent popular or normative clients or causes is not morally questionable, his decision to represent unpopular clients is bound to spur a powerful moral
clash between professional norms on the one hand, and individual and societal norms on the other hand. It is a moral clash that
imposes on the lawyer substantial difficulties in both a professional and personal 28 mode; and thus not everyone is equipped
to deal with it. Under this theory, only lawyers whose mind,
Barbara Allen Babcock, Defending the Guilty, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 175
(1983); Barbara Allen Babcock, Symposium: On Democratic Ground: New
Perspectives on John Hart Ely: On Constitutional Ground: The Duty to Defend, 114 YALE L.J. 1489, 1515-20 (2005). Although Professor Babcock's theory focuses on representation of unpopular clients in criminal matters, its
logical-analytical foundations may well be extended so as to cover representation of unpopular clients and causes in general.
28 Professionally, representation of unpopular clients might result, inter alia,
in injury to the lawyer's reputation and abandonment of existing clients as
well as difficulty to attract potential new clients. Personally, representation of
unpopular clients might result in pressure from family and friends, adverse
community publicity, public denunciation, and in extreme cases even illegitimate threats or physical assaults. For a detailed discussion of the broad array
of difficulties which loom lawyers who represent unpopular clients see, e.g.,
Norman W. Spaulding, The Prophet and the Bureaucrat:PositionalConflicts
in Service Pro Bono Publico, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1395, 1418-20 (1998); Mary
Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1063-65 (2006); Daniel H. Pollitt, Counsel for the Unpopular Cause: The "Hazard of Being Undone", 43 N.C. L.
REV. 9, 20 (1964); Terry Carter, Sins of the Client, 87 A.B.A. J., March 2001
at 21 (2001).
27
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heart, and soul are unconditionally and selflessly devoted to the
ultimate goal of the legal profession - that is, enhancement of
client's autonomy - are apt to take on the unrewarding task of
representing the reprehensible.29
The 'lawyer's personality' theory, like the 'adversarial theory
of representation', is founded on an analytical framework that
impedes the possibility of creating moral dichotomy between
the lawyer as a professional and the lawyer as a private person.
Its underlying assumption, that the choice of clients testifies on
the lawyer's personality, utterly destroys the possibility of creating moral detachment between the professional and the personal. Endorsement of the conception of the lawyer-client
relationship as one, which involves interaction between the
sphere of duty and the private spheres of life, inherently suggests an intense involvement of personal moral values in the
professional process of client selection. Thus, instead of reinforcing the desired notion of the choice of clients as a moralProfessor Babcock identifies five major reasons that generally motivate
lawyers who have been endowed with such a peculiar "mind-set, heart-set,
soul set": (1) the garbage collector's reason (someone must do the dirty work
in order to secure the proper functioning of the legal system); (2) the legalistic or positivist's reason (neither the lawyer or the judge or jury can know the
factual truth; they can only know the legal truth, which is best revealed after
the roles of the lawyers from both sides have been fully played); (3) the political activist's reason (many evil-doers are themselves victims of grave injustices, and therefore there is poetic justice in awarding them adequate
representation once they stand on the other side of the barricade); (4) the
social worker's reason (the man-in-trouble, who often belongs to a disadvantaged underclass, perceives the lawyer as a savior who comes to his rescue,
and thus displays greater willingness to overcome feelings of anger and alienation towards society); (5) the egotist's reason (although representing the abhorrent people of society does not produce the most good, it nonetheless
proves most challenging and provides the most excitement). It would be
noted that these reasons are neither exhaustive nor accumulative or alternative in nature. Rather, they are an eclectic array of possible ideological motivations for representing unpopular clients and causes. Each individual may
choose the reason or the amalgam of reasons which best describe his ideological perception. See Babcock, Defending the Guilty, supra note 27, at 177-79;
29

Babcock, The Duty to Defend, supra note 27, at 1518.
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neutral decision, the 'lawyer's personality' theory establishes an
opposite notion of client selection as an expression of one's personality. The latter imposes on the lawyer moral and public accountability for his choice of clients, and hence exposes him to
public criticism; albeit the fact that the theory's stated goal is to
prevent, or at least mitigate, such criticism.
C.

The Lawyer as Friend

Over thirty years ago Professor Charles Fried offered a somewhat subversive, but incisive theory, which equated the moral
foundations of the lawyer-client relationship to that of friendship.30 Professor Fried suggested that the lawyer is to be perceived as a professional who, by virtue of the lawyer-client
relationship, fulfills the role of the client's friend. Professor
Fried further explained that this friendship is a limited-purpose
friendship, applicable solely to the legal sphere. His theory rests
on the premise that the lawyer, as a "legal friend", enters into a
personal relation with the client, adopts his interests as if they
were his own, and thus expresses an intense identification with
the client's goals; similar to that of a natural friend.3'
Professor Fried openly acknowledged the inherent difficulties
of his theory, 32 but strongly maintained that the true moral foun30 Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundationsof the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976). Following Professor Fried, several other scholars have also offered distinct analytical versions of the legal
friendship analogy. See mainly THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F.
COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (1994);
ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR. ET AL., THE COUNSELOR-AT-LAW: A COLLABORATIVE APPROACH TO CLIENT INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING (1st ed.
1999). My analysis of Professor Fried's theory is equally applicable to these
analytical versions as well.
31 Fried, supra note 30, at 1071-1072.
32 For example, the difficulty of describing as "friendship" a relationship
which has to be bought and which has a known expiration date, the oddness
of a friendship whose main characteristic is lack of reciprocity (only the lawyer devotes himself to the client's interests, not the other way around), etc.
The specific difficulties of Professor Fried's theory are irrelevant to our dis-
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dations of the lawyer's role lie in the analogy to natural friendship. Hence follows the conclusion that the lawyer has moral
liberty to choose his clients - i.e., his friends - as he pleases, and

not according to the utilitarian-communitarian approach, which
focuses on where the greatest need for his particular legal talent
lies.3 3 Similarly, follows the conclusion that within the boundaries of law and ethics, the lawyer is morally entitled (though not
always obligated) to further the interests of the client even
through means which are not consonant with the public
interest. 34
At the core of Professor Fried's theory is the assumption that
the lawyer's role is designed to enhance client's autonomy.35
However, it does so through an analytical framework that not
only impedes the possibility of creating moral dichotomy between the lawyer as a professional and the lawyer as a private
person, but in fact firmly and explicitly establishes the lawyerclient relationship as one which relies on a personal relation of
friendship.36 Perceivingthe action of representation as a form of
friendship indicates the existence of an inherent correlation between the moral choices of the lawyer as a professional and his
moral choices as a private person. Specifically, it indicates that
the choice of clients parallels the choice of friends, and that the
choice of means parallels the manner one chooses to treat his
friends. The fact that the lawyer-client friendship is limited in
scope to the purview of the legal sphere cannot by itself suffice
to create a genuine moral detachment between the professional
and the personal since all of Professor Fried's moral-operative
conclusions with regard to legal friendship are directly and uncussion, which focuses on the ideological macro-framework, rather than on
the particular micro-complexities within it.
33 Fried, supra note 30, at 1078.
34 Id. at 1080-1087.
35 Id. at 1077.
36 See also Postema, supra note 5, at 81 (indicating the fact that the impersonalism and moral detachment characteristic of the lawyer's role are not
found in relations between friends).
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equivocally derived from natural friendship. 37 The 'lawyer as
friend' theory firmly reinforces the notion that the lawyer (as a
role agent) favors his chosen clients, just like he favors his chosen friends (as a private person). This notion of selective favoring undermines the possibility to establish a viable separation
between the lawyer's professional and private spheres of life. 38
The failure to establish a genuine analytical moral detachment
not only thwarts the theory's core-purpose of immunizing the
lawyer from public scrutiny due to choices of clients and means;
but ironically, exposes the lawyer to such scrutiny even more.

HI.

THE ESSENCE OF REPRESENTATION: FORMING A
CONSENSUAL MACRO CONCEPTION OF THE
LAWYER'S ROLE IN SOCIETY

A consensual agreement regarding the exact moral essence of
the lawyer's role in a pluralistic-democratic society can, and perhaps should, never be achieved. In the context of client selection, as well as in various contexts throughout the lawyer-client
relationship, the action of representation often spurs a triplelayered moral clash, 39 which ultimately prevents the formation
of such a consensus: the first layer - role morality - comprises of

the lawyer's responsibility toward the client to provide diligent
and zealous representation within the bounds of the law; the
second layer - personal morality - comprises of the lawyer's re-

sponsibility toward himself, since enhancement of client's autonomy surely cannot come at the expense of the denial of it to the
lawyer; and the third layer - common morality - comprises of

the lawyer's responsibility toward society and the court, since
many of the decisions in his professional capacity may well af37

For a similar criticism, see Postema, Id.; Edward A. Dauer & Arthur Allen

Leff, Correspondence- The Lawyer as a Friend,86 YALE L.J. 573, 576 (1977).
38 Id.
39 For a general discussion of this clash, see Luban, supra note 4; see also

Wasserstrom, supra note 9.
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fect collective good, as well as the manner society perceives his
designated role as an officer of the court.
Within the framework of this triple-layered clash, the organized bar as well as the individual lawyer are often required to
provide feasible solutions to hardly solvable moral dilemmas.
Additionally, because the canons of professional responsibility
usually provide only minimal guidance, the individual lawyer
possesses an overwhelmingly broad discretion to deal with the
dilemmas. 4 0 It is not surprising, then, that every legal theory of
moral philosophy has aspired to fulfill the normative void by
producing the one ultimate analytical explanation of the essence
of the lawyer's role.
Though profound and ingenious, none of these theories has
ever gained wide public support because they are perceived as
portraying the lawyer-client relationship in implausible concepts. Indeed, all theories share an identical common denominator, which ironically is also their common infirmity: an
uncompromised aspiration to form an ultimate conception of
the moral essence of the lawyer's role. However, reaching a consensus as to the morality of the lawyer as a role agent is neither
possible nor desired in multi-cultural societies, in light of the exceptional nature of the action of representation, which puts the
lawyer in a unique and intimate stance and essentially compels
him to "become one" with the chosen client.
William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1083, 1131-1133 (1988); Nathan M. Crystal, Developing a Philosophy of
Lawyering, 14 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETmics & PUB. POL'Y 75 (2000). In Israel,
the problem of minimal ethical guidance is particularly remarkable, since the
rules of professional responsibility are not based on a coherent and organized
philosophical infrastructure. Hence, the code of professional ethics either
completely disregards certain vital issues or regulates them in a flawed manner. For example, in a sharp contrast to the American and English codes, the
Israeli code does not even include comments or rules of instructional guidance, but is only comprised of brief disciplinary rules. As a result, the Israeli
lawyer is particularly prone to experience great difficulties when faced with
the need to thoughtfully handle with complicated ethical dilemmas.
40

Volume 6, Number I

Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016

Pall 2-012

17

DePaul Journal for Social Justice, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 2

DePaul Journal for Social Justice

18

Lawyering, by its nature, often entails making complex moral
decisions. While certain professionals may use the 'lawyer as
friend' theory as a guide, others may adhere to the 'lawyer's personality' theory, or the 'adversarial theory of representation', or
any other moral theory for that matter. One way or another,
role agents are first and foremost autonomous and minded
human beings, and hence every professional decision they make
is subjectively and ideologically motivated. Even an informed
resolution to deny all principled theories and base every decision on earthy ad hoc considerations of self-interest (money,
publicity, reputation, etc.) is an, equally ideological-motivated
decision (though generally not highly acclaimed).
It is therefore evident that the prevalent aspiration to form a
consensual conception of role morality is objectively impractical.41 Plurality of opinions shall always exist in the field of legal
ethics.42 How can it not, when accommodation between competing moral values of role, self, and community is so frequently
required within the framework of such an intimate relationship?
Nevertheless, the absence of a consensual moral theory of
lawyering is not to be construed as leaving the decisions concerning the dilemmas arising from the triple-layered moral clash
solely to the realm of haphazard individual discretion. Although
the theories vary from one another to a lesser or greater degree,
See also Crystal,supra note 40 (arguing that there is no one correct philosophy of lawyering. Therefore, instead of wrongly trying to mandate a choice
among different philosophies, the Bar ought to allow lawyers to either adopt
an existing philosophy or craft their own methodical philosophy of
lawyering).
41

42

See also W. Bradley Wendel, Value Pluralism in Legal Ethics, 78

WASH.

U. L.Q. 113 (2000) (contending that monism in legal ethics analysis is unwarranted and noting the beneficial nature of pluralism); Robert J. Condlin,
"What's Love Got to Do With It?" - "It's Not Like They're Your Friendsfor
Christ's Sake": The Complicated Relationship Between Lawyer and Client, 82

L. REV. 211, 306 (2003) (arguing that it is difficult, if not impossible, to
understand lawyer-client relations, in all of their complexity, within the
boundaries of a single, all-encompassing, theory).
NEB.
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they are all founded on the elementary perception that the function of the lawyer as an agent is to enhance client's autonomy.
Relying on that basic characteristic, each theory attempts to
decode the ultimate moral justification (legal friendship, peculiar personality, adversary advocacy, etc.) for performing that
exceptional function. However, as noted above, by doing so it
inevitably destroys - either deliberately or inadvertently - the

analytical dichotomy between the lawyer's professional and private spheres of life, and thus critically impairs its ability to provide publically acceptable solutions to the many ethical
dilemmas encountered by the lawyer.
The consensus around the fundamental perception that the
lawyer is an agent who enhances the client's autonomy should
therefore be the focal point of a macro theory of lawyering. This
would shift the focus from debating the merits of various subtheories whose goal is to promote particular justifications for
performing the action of legal representation, to the action of
representation itself.
Under such a macro theory, it would be well established that
enhancement of client's autonomy means that the lawyer is, in
effect, an extension of the legal personality of the client.43 Additionally, though the action of representation essentially compels
the lawyer to "become one" with the client, it is not unification
with the client as a person, but rather with the client's rights and
liberties under the law. Hence, for example, a lawyer's choice to
represent the unpopular 'citizen x', who is accused of a heinous
murder, expresses endorsement of x's rights and liberties (x's
legal personality), but not of x as a person (x's moral personality). So is the lawyer's decision to represent the well-liked 'citizen y', who has fallen victim to an outrageous injustice; or any
other individual-in-need for that matter.
The lawyer's decision to represent a certain client would always be perceived as a decision which is based on his capacity as
43

Postema, supra note 5, at 77; Simon, supra note 5, at 42.
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a legal practitioner, and hence the endorsement entailed in the
selection process only extends to the chosen client's legal personality: that is, endorsement of the client's rights to due process
and lawful treatment by law-enforcement authorities, and acknowledgement of the importance of aiding all individuals to
overcome procedural and bureaucratic obstacles in order to be
able to effectively realize their privileges under the law.
Endorsement of the client's moral personality may well exist
also, but it cannot be logically deduced from the selection process in any way since the personal spheres of life lie outside the
purview of the lawyer's designated role. Both a lawyer who endorses the client's moral personality and a lawyer who resents or
is apathetic to the client's moral personality fulfill an identical
professional function as role agents; however, while the latter
limits his involvement with the client solely to the professional
sphere, the former also becomes the client's personal friend (not
a legal friend) in a way that is entirely disconnected from his
professional role. In other words, in those cases where the
choice of clients is also accompanied by the lawyer's endorsement of the client's moral personality, then the lawyer crosses
the professional boundary into the personal spheres of life. And
though this cross of boundaries does not constitute a breach of
the ethical code of conduct, it illuminates the clear-cut separation between the professional and private spheres.
Therefore, according to the macro theory of representation,
there is no valid logical basis for criticizing the lawyer due to his
choice of clients; rather, public criticism may only be aimed at
the person (who so happens to be a legal practitioner) due to his
personal choice of friends. And the validity of such criticism is,
of course, not derived from the professional sphere but rather
solely from the personal and societal ones, since it is in no way
different from criticism that any of us may be exposed to from
family members or friends who do not approve of our personal
choices in life. Drawing such a clear-cut distinction between the
lawyer's professional and private capacities ensures a pragmatic
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public conception of neutrality; and more importantly, it ensures
public understanding of the need to demonstrate civic responsibility, tolerance, and restraint similar to those that we have become accustomed to grant one another in everyday life.
CONCLUSION

This essay has sought to advance a consensual moral conception of lawyering as representation of rights and liberties, rather
than of people. Forming such a consensual macro conception
has vital importance both institutionally and practically.
From an institutional level, it is consonant with all sub-theories because it avoids the futile effort to find one ultimate justification for performing the action of representation, and instead
concentrates on developing a basic ethical infrastructure, which
directly ensues from the moral essence of the action of representation itself.
From a practical standpoint, this conception guarantees a coherent and clear-cut analytical dichotomy between the lawyer as
a professional and the lawyer as a private person, and thus provides a workable ethical framework for resolving the various
ethical dilemmas that are constantly entailed in lawyering.
The general starting point in each case is, therefore, the advancement of a neutral conception of the moral essence of lawyering; a conception that acknowledges multi-cultural diversity
and accordingly does not aspire to impose one particular justification for performing the action of representation. It is a conception that allows infusion of individual-tailored justifications,
but nonetheless ensures that the incorporation of such justifications will be done thoughtfully and after careful consideration of
the lawyer's role as a representative of rights and liberties,
rather than of people. The advantage of developing a simplified
and pragmatic macro theory of lawyering lies in its ability to
provide a neutral, fundamental infrastructure upon which each
individual will be then able to build his own ideological concep-
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tion in a thoughtful, calculated, and tolerant manner; rather
than as a result of haphazard impulses or ephemeral demagogic
trends.
I argue that an important aspect missing from the public discourse on legal ethics nowadays is not profound theories or incisive moral observations; those are found in abundance. Rather,
what is missing is a widespread willingness of professionals and
laymen alike to be comparatively acquainted with prevalent theories, assimilate their principles, and being able to draw
thoughtful insights and conclusions.
A publically accepted macro theory could certainly facilitate
the development of an informed discussion, and thus encourage
all those who wish to take part in the dialogue to demonstrate
civic responsibility and thoughtfully decide whether or not to
adopt sub-theories that support criticism of lawyers due to the
personal (rather than legal) identity of their chosen clients. The
responsibility to act on calculated reason, as is well known,
weakens the power of the demagogue and strengthens the communal respect toward the professional choices that each of us
makes.
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